
























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study 
of Labor 
Managerial Talent, Motivation, and Self-Selection 
into Public Management




Managerial Talent, Motivation, and 





Erasmus University Rotterdam 
and Tinbergen Institute  
 
Robert Dur 
Erasmus University Rotterdam, 












P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 















The quality of public management is a recurrent concern in many countries. Calls to attract 
the economy’s best and brightest managers to the public sector abound. This paper studies 
self-selection into managerial positions in the public and private sector, using a model of a 
perfectly competitive economy where people differ in managerial ability and in public service 
motivation. We find that, if demand for public sector output is not too high, the equilibrium 
return to managerial ability is always higher in the private sector. As a result, relatively many 
of the more able managers self-select into the private sector. Since this outcome is efficient, 
our analysis implies that attracting a more able managerial workforce to the public sector by 
increasing remuneration to private-sector levels is not cost-efficient. 
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The quality of management in the public sector is a recurrent concern in
many countries. Part of this concern is based on the perception that the
public sector is an unattractive employer for high-quality managers. Inferior
remuneration and weak ﬁnancial incentives attract less talented managers
to the public sector and lead them to put little eﬀort in their job. For the
US, this is nicely illustrated by the report of the National Commission on
the Public Service (2003), which concludes that “recognition that there is
much wrong with the current organization and management of the public
service is widespread today.” (p.2) and that “too few of our most talented
citizens are seeking careers in government”( p . i v ) .M o r e o v e r ,“ too many of
the best recruits are rethinking their commitment, either because they are
fed up with the constraints of outmoded personnel systems and unmet expec-
tations for advancement or simply lured away by the substantial diﬀerence
between public and private sector salaries in many areas”( p . 8 ) .
Not only policy makers are concerned about the quality of management
in the public sector. Employees in the public sector have similar concerns
and ‘vote with their feet’, as is illustrated by Table 1. This table reports data
from a large-scale survey conducted by the Dutch Ministry of the Interior
and Kingdom Relations among workers who have quit a public sector job
to take a private sector job or vice versa in 2002 in the Netherlands. The
second and third column of Table 1 list the percentage of workers who claim
that management aspects had been one of the three most important reasons
to quit their former job.1 While 35% of the respondents who moved from
the private sector to the public sector consider management as important
in their decision to quit, this holds for more than 60% of the respondents
moving in opposite direction. It is also clear from Table 1 that management
aspects are an important reason to quit in all 7 branches of the public sector.
Several policy makers have called for a change: The public sector should
attempt to attract the economy’s best and brightest managers. In the words
1Respondents could choose from a list of 19 potential reasons for leaving one’s job,
including items like salary, promotion prospects, atmosphere, and responsibilities. Table
1 gives the percentages of people who among the three most important reasons list either
personnel policies, general management of their unit, or supervision. Similar results arise
if we single out each of these categories. Also, restricting attention to the single most
important reason for leaving one’s job or to people who do not supervise anyone themselves
do not alter the general picture.
1Table 1: Percentage of workers who mention management aspects
as one of the three most important reasons to quit their former
job
Workers moving Workers moving
from the private sector from the public sector
to the public sector to the private sector
All 35.0 61.6
Part of public sector
Central government 33.9 61.3






Data source: Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, Mobiliteitsonderzoek 2002.
All diﬀerences between inﬂow and outﬂow are signiﬁcant at the 1% level except
for the sector hospitals. The total number of respondents is 3038.
1 Research consists of universities and research institutes.
2 Only university hospitals were included in the survey.
of the National Commission on the Public Service (2003): “Salaries for
[executives in government] should be based on the compelling need to recruit
and retain the best people possible.”(p.26) 2 This paper questions this view.
In a nutshell, we show that, if demand for public sector output is not too
high, perfect competition on all markets results in an equilibrium where
relatively few of the more able managers seek employment in the public
sector. The equilibrium is eﬃcient, both from the point of view of a social
planner as well as of a policy maker aiming to deliver a certain amount
of public sector output at lowest cost. Hence, attempts to attract a more
able managerial workforce to the public sector by increasing remuneration
to private-sector levels are not eﬃcient.
2Similar recommendations can be found in a report from the OECD (2001) that studies
countries’ experiences with recruiting and retaining public sector personnel. The report
concludes that “The public sector is not usually able to compete with the salaries oﬀered by
private employers, especially those of highly-educated personnel and managers. However,
pay increases may be necessary to prevent an outﬂow of highly-qualiﬁed personnel.”( p .
29)
2We develop a model of a perfectly competitive economy with two sec-
tors, the public sector and the private sector. The sectors diﬀer only in the
kind of output that is produced; production technology and the institutional
environment are assumed identical. Production takes place in units consist-
ing of one manager. Output is homogeneous within a sector, and is sold at
the market-clearing price. Further, managers are residual claimants of their
unit.3
Crucially, people in our economy diﬀer in two characteristics. First,
people diﬀer in managerial talent. Talent increases one’s eﬀectiveness as a
manager. Hence, better managers earn a higher income and attain higher
utility.
Second, people in our economy diﬀer in public service motivation (PSM),
which we deﬁne as a relative preference for working in the public sector.
Public service motivation can arise from a preference for tasks speciﬁct o
the public sector, for contributing to goals speciﬁc to public organizations,
or for helping the speciﬁc set of clients that is served by public organizations
in sectors like health care and education.4 In most of the paper we let a
person’s PSM be independent of eﬀort and output; later on, we relax this
assumption. Crucially, we assume that PSM is suﬃciently widespread in
the economy (or, equivalently, that demand for public sector output is not
too high) so that in equilibrium the marginal managers have positive public
service motivation. Consequently, the equilibrium price of public sector
output must be lower than the price of output in the private sector. For
otherwise, a given amount of production in the public sector would yield
managers equal or higher revenue and higher motivational utility compared
t ot h ep r i v a t es e c t o r ,s ot h a tn oo n ew i t hp o s i t i v eP S Mw o u l db ew i l l i n gt o
become manager of a unit in the private sector.
These diﬀerences in output prices between the public and the private
sector have profound implications for the eﬀect of managerial ability on a
3This may seem to be a far cry from real-world production and wage determination
in the public sector. However, this setup allows us to analyse self-selection of people into
sectors when no restrictions are being imposed on price or wage formation, which gives
the eﬃcient allocation. This serves as a benchmark for evaluating attempts to improve
upon the pool of people opting for public management.
4Recent empirical studies on the motivation of workers in the public sector include
Antonazzo et al. (2003) on nursing workers, Edmonds et al. (2002) on teachers, and
Frank and Lewis (2004) and Gregg et al. (2008) on employees in these and several other
areas of the public sector. Le Grand (2003, ch.2) and Perry and Hondeghem (2008) provide
overviews of the empirical literature on PSM.
3manager’s payoﬀ in the two sectors, and so for the sorting of people into
public and private management. We show that, in any equilibrium where
demand for public sector output is not too high, the marginal return to
managerial ability is higher in the private sector than in the public sector.
Hence, the relative attractiveness of the public sector decreases in ability,
and when the right tail of the ability distribution is suﬃciently long, all
of the most talented managers reside in the private sector. Furthermore,
relatively many of the least able managers sort into the public sector.
An important aspect of our analysis is that low remuneration for man-
agers in the public sector arises endogenously. While this implies that the
public sector attracts managers with relatively low ability, it is the least
costly way of producing a given amount of public sector output. Hence,
attempts to attract a more able managerial workforce to the public sector
by increasing remuneration to private-sector levels are not eﬃcient, neither
from the perspective of a policy maker minimizing cost of public goods pro-
vision nor for a social planner maximizing social welfare.
Our theory is well in line with recent empirical ﬁndings on public-private
wage diﬀerentials at the higher echelons as presented by Bargain and Melly
(2008), using panel data for France. Whereas cross-sectional estimates show
substantial negative public sector wage premia at the top of the wage distri-
bution, these are much smaller when controlling for individual ﬁxed eﬀects.
Bargain and Melly (2008) conclude from this ﬁnding that: “At the top of
the wage distribution, agents with the highest wage potential ... have self-
selected in the private sector” (p.13). Earlier papers on public-private wage
diﬀerentials also ﬁnd public sector wage penalties at the top of the wage
distribution (Poterba and Rueben, 1994; Disney and Gosling, 1998; Melly,
2005), but cannot account for endogenous selection eﬀects.5
Our theory is also applicable beyond the public-private setting. For in-
stance, jobs oﬀered by non-proﬁt organizations are often regarded as attrac-
tive to intrinsically motivated people (cf. Preston, 1989; Rose-Ackerman,
1996). In line with this, most empirical studies ﬁnd a negative wage dif-
ferential in the non-proﬁt sector (Mocan and Tekin (2003) being a notable
exception), and some studies attribute this ﬁnding partially to selection ef-
5At the bottom of the wage distribution, empirical studies often ﬁnd positive rather
than negative wage premia. One reason — outside the scope of our theory — for this may be
that, during wage negotiations, employers in the public sector are less tough than private
sector employers, as in e.g. Haskel and Szymanski (1993).
4fects. For instance, Weisbrod (1983) ﬁnds a 20% wage penalty for lawyers in
non-proﬁt ‘public interest’ ﬁrms, while Goddeeris (1988) argues that a large
part of this diﬀerential is driven by selection. In line with our theory, Pre-
ston (1989) ﬁnds that the non-proﬁt wage penalty is higher for managers
and professionals than for sales and clerical workers, and her results sup-
port the hypothesis that the wage diﬀerence is partially driven by selection.
Lastly, Roomkin and Weisbrod (1999) show that top executives in for-proﬁt
hospitals receive both higher total income and stronger monetary incentives
than their counterparts in non-proﬁt hospitals, and that these diﬀerences
are smaller at lower levels in the hierarchy.
We proceed as follows. The next section discusses related literature.
Section 3 describes the model, which is next analysed in Section 4.6 In
Section 5, we study the case where utility derived from PSM depends on
output. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our paper builds on the literature on compensating wage diﬀerentials. The
theory of equalizing diﬀerences developed by Rosen (1974) asserts that in a
competitive labour market, marginal workers’ valuation of job attributes is
reﬂected in compensating wage diﬀerentials (see also Brown, 1980; Rosen,
1986). Selection eﬀects complicate the empirical estimation of these compen-
sating wage diﬀerentials, see e.g. Goddeeris (1988) and Hwang et al. (1992).
T h er e a s o ni st h a tw a g ed i ﬀerentials may also arise from unobserved diﬀer-
ences in workers’ ability, which in turn may be related to job attributes,
e.g. because a worker’s valuation of job attributes depends on his income
(Goddeeris, 1988; Krueger and Summers, 1988; Gibbons and Katz, 1992).
Recent work using matched employee-employer data establishes that inter-
industry wage diﬀerentials are largely explained by these unobserved ability
diﬀerences (Abowd et al., 1999; Goux and Maurin, 1999). In line with these
ﬁndings, the public-private earnings diﬀerential for managers that arises in
our theoretical analysis is partly a ‘true’ compensating earnings diﬀerential
and partly caused by selection, where selection arises endogenously from the
adjustment in prices to diﬀerences in sectors’ job attributes.
6A more extensive model, including two types of jobs per sector (manager and worker)
and endogenous demand for workers by managers, is contained in a previous version of
this paper (Delfgaauw and Dur, 2008b).
5A recent literature in economics on intrinsic motivation examines the
assignment of diﬀerently motivated workers to jobs that vary in intrinsic
qualities (e.g. Handy and Katz, 1998; Dixit, 2002; Besley and Ghatak,
2005; Francois, 2007; Prendergast, 2007; Delfgaauw and Dur, 2007, 2008a;
Macchiavello, 2008). A key prediction of this literature is relatively low
pay and weak monetary incentives in jobs with high intrinsic qualities, as
these lead to self-selection of job applicants with high motivation. Typi-
cally, papers in this literature have either a moral-hazard framework (such
as Besley and Ghatak, 2005; Francois, 2000) or an adverse-selection frame-
work (Handy and Katz, 1998; Delfgaauw and Dur, 2007, 2008a), or both
(Francois, 2007; Prendergast, 2007). We contribute to this literature by
studying occupational choice when people diﬀer in intrinsic motivation and
in ability. We show that even in the absence of information asymmetries,
intrinsically rewarding jobs are associated with lower (incentive) pay and
attract, on average, people with lower ability.
Previous studies have modelled public service motivation in a variety of
ways: as a concern for the level of public service arising from (pure) altru-
ism (Francois 2000, 2007; Prendergast, 2007), as enjoyment of one’s personal
contribution to public service (Besley and Ghatak, 2005; Delfgaauw and Dur,
2007, 2008a), and as a non-monetary beneﬁt of being employed in the public
sector, unrelated to eﬀort or output (Handy and Katz, 1998; Macchiavello,
2008). These diﬀerent approaches correspond well to Perry and Wise (1990),
a key article on PSM in the public administration literature. Their typol-
ogy of public service motivation includes both the "desire to serve" as well
as the "desire to participate" as the latter "can be exciting, dramatic, and
reinforcing of an individual’s image of self importance" (p.368).7 In most of
this paper, we equate PSM with a non-monetary beneﬁt of being employed
in the public sector, and show that the presence of such public service mo-
tivation implies that, on average, individuals with relatively weak ability
self-select into public management. In Section 5, however, we show that in
our model, there is neither negative nor positive sorting of ability into the
public sector when individuals’ utility from PSM is output-dependent only.
Hence, when PSM yields both output-dependent and output-independent
7An earlier stream of research in public administration stresses the prestige value of
holding a public sector job, see Perry and Wise (1990) for a brief discussion and relevant
references.
6beneﬁts, negative selection of ability into the public sector arises.
3T h e M o d e l
We consider a perfectly competitive economy consisting of two sectors  ∈
[]: the public sector () and the private sector (). All individuals in
the economy choose between working in the public sector and working in
the private sector; including the option of being unemployed does not aﬀect
the main results. Output produced in sector  is sold at price  per unit.
Throughout, we assume that demand for products and, hence, prices are
such that production takes place in both sectors of the economy. We think
of demand for public sector output as stemming from a political process,
which we treat as exogenous. In most of the analysis, we shall assume that
this demand for public sector output triggers market supply. Proposition
3, however, will generalize our results to the case where a social planner
or a policy maker who aims to minimize the cost of public sector output
designs contracts so as to attract people to produce public sector output.
For simplicity, we assume that taxes are nondistortionary. This allows us to
ignore taxation throughout the analysis.
People are heterogenous in two dimensions. First, they diﬀer in manage-
rial ability  ∈ [0 ¯ ]. The implications of  for an individual’s productivity
and payoﬀ will become clear from our description of production technology
below. Second, people diﬀer in their intrinsic preference for working in the
public sector relative to working in the private sector. Initially, we assume
that this intrinsic utility only depends on the choice of sector. In Section
5, we study the case where it depends on the level of one’s production. Let

 denote individual ’s intrinsic utility derived from working in sector .
For convenience, we normalize individuals’ intrinsic utility from working in
the private sector to zero: 
 =0for all . This implies that 

 describes
an individual’s relative intrinsic preference for working in the public sector,
which we refer to as ‘public service motivation’ (PSM). Generally, people
may intrinsically prefer to work in either sector; that is, an individual’s 


can be positive or negative. We focus on the case where PSM is suﬃciently
prevalent (or, equivalently, where demand for public sector output is suf-
ﬁciently low) so that in equilibrium the marginal individuals have strictly
7positive public service motivation.8 Without further loss of generality, this
key assumption allows us to reduce the type space to non-negative PSM:


 ∈ [0¯ ].9 The density of the joint distribution of  and 

 is described
by ()  0 over its support [0 ¯ ] × [0 ¯ ] and zero elsewhere.
Production technology is identical across sectors. When individual 
exerts eﬀort 
 in sector , his productivity equals (
 ). W em a k et h e
following assumptions about the production function. First, both eﬀort
and ability must be positive to generate production, (·0) = (0·)=0 .
Second, production is concave in both elements:   0,   0,  
0,   0, where, throughout the paper, subscripts to functions denote
partial derivatives. Third, we assume that ability increases the marginal
productivity of eﬀort and vice versa:   0.
Individuals derive utility from their income  and from their intrinsic
preference for working in a sector 
. They derive disutility from exerting






As usual, the cost of eﬀort are increasing and (weakly) convex:   0,
 ≥ 0. Perfect competition in both sectors implies that individuals earn




8Boyne (2002) reviews evidence in the public administration and management literature
on diﬀerences between managers in the private and public sector, which suggests that on
average, public-sector managers tend to place more emphasis on public service and less on
remuneration than private-sector managers. Similar diﬀerences have been found between
public and private sector employees, see in addition to the studies mentioned in footnote 4
e.g. Crewson (1997), Houston (2000), and Lewis and Frank (2002); Rainey and Bozeman
(2000) and Wright (2001) provide overviews. Whether marginal individuals have positive
PSM cannot be inferred from these studies. However, this key assumption in our paper is
in line with the negative public sector wage premia at the top of the wage distribution as
found by the empirical studies discussed at the end of the Introduction.
9Given that marginal individuals have positive PSM, all individuals with negative PSM
always prefer to work in the private sector; see also footnote 10 below.
84O p t i m a l E ﬀort and Occupational Choice
4.1 Optimal Eﬀort
An individual who chooses to work in sector  decides how much eﬀort to
exert, taking price  as given. Substituting individual’s income (2) into
utility function (1) and maximizing with respect to 
, we obtain the ﬁrst-
order condition:
(
 ) − (
)=0  (3)
Let ˜ 
 be the solution to (3) for individual  in sector .N o t et h a t˜ 
 does
not depend on 
. Proposition 1 describes the comparative static eﬀects of
managerial ability  and the product price  on individual’s eﬀort, which
have a straightforward interpretation.
Proposition 1 (i) Given ability , optimal eﬀort ˜ 
 increases in price .
(ii) Given price , optimal eﬀort ˜ 
 increases in ability .
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
An implication of Proposition 1 (i) is that if  = , a given individual
would exert the same level of eﬀort in both sectors, ˜ 

 =˜ 
 ,w h i l ei f  
(respectively   ), then ˜ 

  ˜ 
 (˜ 

  ˜ 
).
4.2 Occupational Choice
Individuals choose their sector of employment, taking output prices  and
 as given. Given optimal eﬀort ˜ 
, an individual’s utility from working in
the private sector and in the public sector is given by, respectively:

 = (˜ 








 − (˜ 

) (5)
An individual is indiﬀerent between working in either sector when the ex-
pression in (4) equals the one in (5), which can be written as:


 = (˜ 
  ) − (˜ 
) − [(˜ 

 ) − (˜ 

)] (6)
Equation (6) describes, for each level of ability , the level of public service
motivation  at which individuals are indiﬀerent between the two sectors.
9People with higher public service motivation strictly prefer the public sector,
while people with lower public service motivation strictly prefer the private
sector. Equation (6) can be depicted as an indiﬀerence curve in the ()-
plane, which fully characterizes the equilibrium allocation of individuals to
sectors.
Lemma 1 establishes that if demand for public sector output is suﬃ-
ciently high, so that marginal individuals have strictly positive PSM, the
price of private sector output  is higher than the price of public sector
output .
Lemma 1 If  ≤ , all individuals with   0 and 

  0 prefer working
in the public sector to working in the private sector. Only when  is higher
than , a strictly positive number of people with   0 and   0 choose
to work in the private sector.
Proof. Consider an individual with   0 and 

  0,w h oo p t i m a l l y
chooses ˜ 
 when working in the private sector. Suppose this individual
would choose the same level of eﬀort in the public sector, implying the
same level of production. Then, if  ≤ ,h i sp a y o ﬀ in the public sector
is always higher because revenues are weakly higher and, since 

  0,
intrinsic utility is higher (compare (4) and (5)). Setting 

 at its optimal
level increases the payoﬀ of working in the public sector even further. Hence,
if  ≤ , all individuals with   0 and 

  0 strictly prefer working
in the public sector to working in the private sector, so that no production
takes place in the private sector. Increasing  makes private sector positions
more attractive, while leaving the payoﬀ of positions in the public sector
unchanged.    is suﬃcient to attract some individuals with   0 and


  0 to the private sector.
Lemma 1 is crucial for our results. It shows that competition between
diﬀerently motivated people for positions in the two sectors results in a
diﬀerence in output prices. Competition between individuals with positive
PSM for positions in the public sector drives down the public sector output
price below the output price in the private sector.
This diﬀerence in prices has profound implications for the eﬀect of ability
on an individual’s payoﬀ in the two sectors, and so for the sorting of highly
able people into the public sector. Proposition 2 shows that, in the relevant
case where some people with positive PSM prefer to work in the private
10sector, earnings rise faster with ability in the private sector than in the
public sector. As a result, indiﬀerence curve (6) is upward-sloping.
Proposition 2 Given that some individuals with 

  0 prefer to work in
the private sector, indiﬀerence curve (6)
(i) starts in the origin of the ()-plane, and
(ii) is upward sloping for all  ≥ 0 and 

 ≥ 0.
Proof. (i) As (·0) = 0, individuals with  =0do not generate income
in either sector and, hence, are indiﬀerent between the two sectors when
they do not intrinsically prefer one sector to the other, i.e. when 

 =
0. Hence, indiﬀerence curve (6) crosses the origin of the ()-plane. (ii)






 ) − (˜ 

 )  0 (7)
where the eﬀects through changes in ˜ 
 and ˜ 

 are zero by the envelope
theorem. By Lemma 1, we know that   . From this and Proposition 1
it follows that ˜ 
 ≥ ˜ 

. Hence, since ()  0, it follows that (˜ 
  ) 
(˜ 

 ). It follows that (˜ 
 )  (˜ 





The intuition behind this result is straightforward. The diﬀerence in
output prices creates an earnings gap between the two sectors. This earnings
gap increases in ability as more able individuals produce more. Hence, more
able individuals suﬀer from a higher income loss when switching from the
private sector to the public sector, implying that their PSM needs to be
higher to make such a switch attractive. As a result, there is negative
selection of ability into the public sector.10
Overall, our results give a bleak picture of the quality of public manage-
ment. Relatively few of the highly able individuals choose careers in public
10Adding individuals with negative public service motivation to our economy does not
aﬀect this result, as long as marginal individuals have positive PSM. If, in contrast to our
key assumption, marginal individuals would have negative PSM, then equilibrium prices
would be such that the right-hand side of (6) is negative and decreasing in ability. In
contrast to the empirical evidence discussed in the Introduction, this would imply that
highly able individuals would earn more in the public sector than in the private sector,
and that only people with suﬃcient distaste for working in the public sector would opt
for a position in the private sector. Given the evidence, we believe that the results we
highlight are most relevant.
11service (see Proposition 2). Moreover, from Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 it
follows that those working in the public sector exert less eﬀort than equally
able individuals working in the priva t es e c t o r . Y e t ,t h i si sa sg o o da si t
gets: it is the most eﬃcient way of producing public sector output. This
follows directly from the absence of market failures in our economy. In other
words, any attempt to deviate from the eﬀort levels or individuals’ selection
into the public sector that arise under competition results in higher per-unit
costs of public sector output as well as in lower social welfare. Proposition
3 underlines this result. It shows that both a policy maker aiming to mini-
mize the costs of producing a given amount of public sector output, as well
as a social planner aiming to maximize the sum of all individuals’ utilities,
recruit the same people into public employment and induce the same eﬀort
as results under competition.
Proposition 3 The self-selection of individuals into the public sector and
their choices with respect to eﬀort are eﬃcient, both from the perspective of
a policy maker aiming to minimize costso fp u b l i cs e c t o ro u t p u ta n df r o ma
social-welfare perspective.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
5 Output-Oriented PSM
In the previous sections, we have assumed that the intrinsic utility derived
from public service motivation is independent of the output one generates.
As discussed in Section 2, this contrasts with some of the literature on PSM
where this intrinsic utility depends on eﬀort or (one’s personal contribu-
tion to) output, be it out of impure (‘warm-glow’) or pure altruism.11 We
now show that in our framework, output-dependent utility from PSM yields
ability-neutral sorting of individuals across sectors. This implies that an
output-independent component is necessary to obtain negative selection of
ability into the public sector, but that adding an output-dependent compo-
nent to the model of the previous sections would not change our results.
11Francois (2000, 2007) shows that in the context of monopoly supply of public sector
output and in the presence of moral hazard, pure altruism leads to a free-rider problem,
whereas impure altruism does not; see Francois and Vlassopoulos (2008) for an insightful
discussion of this issue. In our context of perfect competition, however, this free-rider
problem does not arise. Hence, in our setup, impure and pure altruism result in exactly
the same behaviour.
12The only diﬀerence with the model studied in the previous section is the





 ) − (
) (8)
where the second term reﬂects that intrinsic utility depends on the output
one produces. Substituting (2) for income 
 and maximizing with respect
to eﬀort yields the ﬁrst-order condition:
( + 
)(
 ) − (
)=0  (9)
Let ˆ 
 denote the solution to (9). Clearly, optimal eﬀort ˆ 
 is now increasing
in 
. Also, comparing optimal eﬀort for a given individual across sectors,
it follows from (9) and 
 =0that ˆ 
  ˆ 

 i fa n do n l yi f   + 

.
It is easily veriﬁed that Lemma 1 carries over to the present model. As
intrinsic utility is (weakly) higher in the public sector for all individuals,
there are no individuals with positive PSM who strictly prefer the private
sector when  ≤ . Hence, competition among individuals with positive
PSM for public sector positions results again in a lower output price in the
public sector,   .
The diﬀerence in output price yields a diﬀerence in the monetary return
to ability across sectors. However, and in contrast to the previous section,
this does not aﬀect the total return to ability, as is shown in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 There is a single level of 

, given by ˇ  =  −,a tw h i c h
individuals are indiﬀerent between the public sector and the private sector.
Individuals with 

  ˇ  strictly prefer working in the public sector to working
in the private sector and vice versa.
Proof. Using (8) and (2), individual  is indiﬀerent between the public
sector and the private sector when
(ˆ 
  ) − (ˆ 




 ) − (ˆ 

) (10)
From (9), it follows that if  =  + 








 ). Hence, equation (10) holds if  =  + 

.A su t i l i t y
in sector  as described by (8) is strictly increasing in  + 
,e q u a t i o n
(10) holds only if  =  + 

. Hence, the level of 

 at which people are
13indiﬀerent is independent of .
Proposition 4 shows that there is neither negative nor positive selection
of ability into the public sector when intrinsic utility from public service
motivation is fully output-dependent. As in the previous section, the lower
output price makes the public sector relatively unattractive for high-ability
individuals from a monetary perspective, because the diﬀerence in earnings
between the sectors increases in ability. However, the diﬀerence in intrinsic
utility between the sectors now also increases in ability. These eﬀects exactly
oﬀset each other, so that selection into the public sector is ability-neutral.12
6 Concluding Remarks
We have shown that competition between people with diﬀerent levels of pub-
lic service motivation and managerial ability results in a negative selection
of managerial ability into the public sector. The willingness of public sector
managers to accept lower pay in return for (what they perceive as) a more
meaningful job results in a lower per-unit output price in the public sector as
compared to the private sector. This, in turn, creates a public-private earn-
ings penalty for managers which increases in managerial ability. As a result,
many of the ‘best and brightest’ managers of the economy reside in the pri-
vate sector and the least able managers predominantly sort into the public
sector. Moreover, managers in the public sector manage less diligently than
managers with the same ability in the private sector as the public sector
rewards good performance to a lesser extent.
The equilibrium allocation of managerial talent and eﬀort that arises in
our economy seems, at ﬁrst sight, far from socially optimal. Yet, this allo-
cation is eﬃcient: it is the least costly way of producing a given amount of
public output and it results in maximum social welfare as well. This has im-
portant implications for public sector human resource policies. When public
service motivation is suﬃciently prevalent in (a subsector of) the public sec-
tor, agencies should not aim to recruit and retain the ‘best and brightest’
managers at all cost, but rather aim at less productive, but better motivated
people. Even though this results in relatively weak public management, the
12Clearly, when utility from income and utility from PSM are concave, the two eﬀects
need not exactly cancel. Hence, either positive or negative selection may arise depending
on the exact speciﬁcation of the utility function.
14beneﬁts of improving the quality of public managers by increasing remuner-
ation to private sector levels, as called for by various policy reports discussed
in the Introduction, are bound to be smaller than the cost.
Our analysis can be extended in several interesting directions. The sem-
inal papers by Rosen (1982) and Waldman (1984), on the assignment of
people with heterogeneous ability to diﬀerent hierarchical levels in ﬁrms,
show that if managerial and subordinate inputs are complementary in pro-
duction, market forces assign the best-performing individuals to the top of
large organizations. Output, labour input, ﬁrm size, and managerial rewards
all increase more than proportionally in managerial ability. Our model can
be extended along these lines by including (the option of having) additional
layers in an organization’s hierarchy (the previous version of this paper (Delf-
gaauw and Dur (2008b)) takes some steps in that direction). This would
magnify the diﬀerences between organizations in the public and the private
sector. The lower ability of top managers in the public sector reduces the
marginal productivity of their middle managers. This further increases the
diﬀerence in return to ability between the sectors for people with intermedi-
ate ability, which exacerbates the negative selection of ability into the public
sector.
The inferior management of public sector organizations implies that pro-
ductivity is lower than in comparable private sector organizations. In the
situation where, for reasons outside our model, a single agency produces all
public sector output, an organization arises with more workers than a com-
parable organization in the private sector would employ. Generally, the low
productivity and apparent overstaﬃng of government agencies is attributed
to bureaucratic empire-building (Niskanen, 1971) or to political preferences
for excessive employment (Haskel and Szymanski, 1993; Corneo and Rob,
2003). Our theory suggests an eﬃciency reason: combining less productive
but highly motivated management to a larger personnel base is cost-eﬃcient.
15AP r o o f s
A.1 Proposition 1







 ) − (˜ 
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Consider a public monopsonist that aims to minimize the costs of producing
a given amount of public sector output . The monopsonist has full infor-
mation about each individual’s type and can verify the eﬀort they exert. It
attracts individuals to the public sector by oﬀering wage  to individual 
conditional on the provision of eﬀort level 

. Individual  accepts the oﬀer








 is the utility attained by individual  when working in the private
sector, as given by (4). As 
 is independent of 

, it follows that for a
given level of ,c o s tp e ru n i to fe ﬀort and hence output decreases with 

.
Hence, the monopsonist prefers to attract better motivated to less motivated
people. Let () be the motivation of the least motivated individual the
monopsonist attracts among individuals with ability . Total costs of public







A cost-minimising monopsonist will make oﬀers such that (11) holds with
















The production constraint dictates that the sum of the amounts produced









The monopsonist minimizes (13) with respect to () and 

 for all ,
subject to the production constraint (14). For ease of exposition, we neglect




















where  is the Lagrange multiplier for the production constraint (14). The
ﬁrst-order condition with respect to 







Comparing with (3), this ﬁrst-order condition is identical to the one for op-
timal eﬀort under competition with  replacing .T h eﬁrst-order condition





















 )=0 . Using (4), the relation between ()




 ) − (˜ 

 )
where all eﬀects of  through ˜ 
 and ˜ 

 are zero by the envelope theorem.
Both the level and the slope of () are identical to those deﬁning indif-
17ference curve (6) under competition when  = .
Noting that the public monopsonist must meet the marginal individuals’
participation constraints, it follows that the shadow price of public output
 equals . Hence, our results above imply that the public monopsonist
recruits the same individuals and induces the same eﬀort levels as arise under
competition, given the level of public sector output.
Social planner
Now consider a social planner that wants to maximize social welfare, de-
ﬁned as the sum of all individuals’ utility minus the costs of public sector
output,13 subject to production constraint (14). Again, the planner attracts
individuals to the public sector by oﬀering wage  to individual  condi-
tional on the provision of eﬀort level 

 and subject to the participation
constraint (11) holding with equality. As before, it is easy to show that the
social planner prefers to attract better motivated over less motivated people























Note that we can rewrite (15) such that  drops out. Clearly, since taxes
are nondistortionary and utility is linear in income, public sector wages
do not aﬀect total welfare (but must fulﬁll the individuals’ participation






















This objective function is identical to the objective function (13) minimized
by the monopsonist, except for the signs (which are, naturally, opposite)
and the last term (which is a constant). Hence, social-welfare maximization,
13Recall that, when studying the individuals’ choices of eﬀort and occupation, we ig-
nored taxation for notational convenience. This was innocuous by our assumption of
non-distortionary (lump-sum) taxation. Here, however, we need to take the level of taxes
i n t oa c c o u n ta si td o e sa ﬀect individuals’ utilities and, hence, the aggregate level of social
welfare. Hence, we subtract the costs of public sector output (which equal the level of
taxes) from the sum of individuals’ utility.
18cost-minimization, and perfect competition yield the same selection of people
to the sectors as well as identical levels of eﬀort.
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